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Abstract
This paper considers the optimal taxation of transactions services in a dynamic
general equilibrium setting, where households use both cash and costly transactions
services provided by banks to purchase consumption goods. With a full set of all tax
instruments, the optimal tax structure is indeterminate. However, all optimal tax
structures distort the relative costs of payment media, by raising the relative cost
of deposits to cash. In the simplest optimal tax structure, the Friedman rule holds
i.e. cash should be untaxed, and the rate of tax on transactions services can be
higher or lower than the consumption tax. When parameters are calibrated to US
data, simulations suggest that the transactions services tax should be considerably
lower. This is because a transactions tax has a "double distortion": it distorts the
choice between payment media, and indirectly taxes consumption. This contrasts
with the special case of the cashless economy, when the rst distortion is absent: in
this case, it is optimal to tax transactions services at the same rate as consumption.
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1. Introduction
Financial intermediation services include such important services as intermediation be-
tween borrowers and lenders, insurance, and payment transaction services (e.g. credit and
debit card services). These services comprise a signicant and growing part of the na-
tional economy; for example, nancial intermediation services, measured using the OECD
methodology1, were 3.9% of GDP in the UK in 1970, and increased to 7.9% by 2005. Over
the same time period, from 1970 to 2005, the increase for Eurozone countries as a whole
has been from 2.7% to 5.5%. In the US, the nance and insurance sector, excluding real
estate, which includes nancial intermediation, accounted for 7.3% of US value-added in
1999, rising to 8.4% in 20092.
The question of whether, and how, nancial intermediation services should be taxed is
a contentious one3. Currently, within European Union countries, most nancial interme-
diation services are exempt from VAT, notably nancial services which are not explicitly
priced. Similarly, in the US, very few states tax nancial services4. Current practice re-
ects the fact that there are technical di¢ culties in taxing nancial intermediation when
those services are not explicitly priced (so-called margin-based services), such as inter-
mediation between borrowers and lenders. However, conceptually, the problems can be
solved, for example, by use of a cash-ow VAT (Ho¤man et al., 1987; Poddar and English,
1997; Huizinga, 2002; Zee, 2005), and the increasing sophistication of banksIT systems
means that these solutions are also becoming practical.
As a result, there is considerable debate, at least in Europe, about the possible revenue
and welfare gains from imposing VAT on nancial intermediation services (de la Feria and
Lockwood, 2010; PWC, 2011; Buettner and Erbe, 2012). In this literature, it is largely
assumed that within a consumption tax system, such as a VAT, it is desirable to tax
1This methodology yields FISIM, that is nancial intermediation services indirectly measured: see
http://www.euklems.net. The latest year for which data are available for EU countries on a consistent
basis from the Klems database is 2005: for the UK, data for 2011 show that this share has further risen
to 9%.
2See http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm
3There are technical di¢ culties in taxing nancial intermediation when those services are not explic-
itly priced (so-called margin-based services), such as the intermediation between borrowers and lenders.
However, conceptually, the problems can be solved, for example, by use of a cash-ow VAT (Ho¤man
et al., 1987; Poddar and English, 1997; Huizinga, 2002; Zee, 2005), and the increasing sophistication of
banksIT systems means that these solutions are also becoming practical.
4Data available from the website of the Federation of Tax Administrators (taxadmin.org) indicates
that in 2007, for example, only two states, Indiana and Washington, taxed "service charges of banking
institutions".
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nancial services supplied at the standard rate of VAT, and allow nancial intermediation
services providers - banks and insurance companies - to claim back VAT they pay on
inputs: see e.g. Ebril et al. (2001). Also, the recent IMF proposals for a bank tax
to cover the cost of government interventions in the banking system include a Financial
Activities Tax levied on bank prots and remuneration, one version of which - FAT1 -
which would work very much like a VAT (IMF, 2010).
Bringing nancial intermediation services within the scope of VAT in this way would
(a) tax nancial intermediation services to households at the same rates as taxes on other
goods; (b) in principle, eliminate existing distortions in the production chain due to the
fact that nancial intermediation services sales to rms currently include irrecoverable
VAT on inputs. Advantage (b) of applying VAT to nancial intermediation services is
generally accepted. However, it is less clear that the nancial intermediation services
supplied to households should be taxed at the same rate as other goods and services.
This important question has received remarkably little attention. In particular, while
there is an established literature on optimal taxation in monetary models, these models
without exception, assume either that cash is the only medium of payment, or that some
goods can be bought on credit, and so do not address the issue of how intermediation
services provided by banks should be taxed5. This paper attempts to ll the gap, by study
of the optimal tax structure in a setting based on the well-known model of Freeman and
Kydland (2000), originally used to study the relationship between money aggregates and
output.
In our model, the household demands di¤erent varieties of goods in di¤erent quantities,
and total consumption demand must be met by holdings of cash or bank deposits. The
inconvenience of holding large quantities of cash is explicitly modelled, meaning that in
equilibrium, there will be a "switch point" above which varieties will be bought using
deposits. Competitive banks can provide deposits (and the services associated with them,
such as cheques and debit cards) and a cost, and the value-added of banks can be taxed at
a rate  d: The government can also levy a wage tax (or equivalently a general consumption
tax) and an interest income tax, as in the dynamic optimal tax literature. The government
then chooses the taxes, plus the rate of ination, to minimize the deadweight loss of
providing a public good in each period.
The solution to this tax design problem yields the following insights. First, the opti-
5See for example, Correia and Teles (1996), (1999) which consider a transactions cost theory of money
demand, or Chari et al. (1991),(1996), where some goods can be bought on costless credit. This literature
is further discused in Section 2 below.
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mal taxes are technically indeterminate, as the government can (implicitly) control four
"prices" facing the household; the opportunity cost of cash and of deposits, the price of
consumption relative to leisure, and the relative price of present and future consumption.
But, the household only makes three choices; consumption, leisure, and the relative pro-
portions of cash and deposits: However, it can be shown that all optimal tax structures
distort the relative costs of payment media, by raising the relative cost of deposits to cash.
Moreover, within the class of optimal tax structures, there is only one that is simple
and intuitive. This is where the opportunity cost of holding money is zero i.e. the
Friedman rule applies. Then, the wage tax (or general consumption tax) is set according
to a standard Ramsey formula, and the interest income tax is zero in the steady state, as
in Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985).
The tax faced by the households on transaction services (the combination of the general
consumption tax and  d) bears a simple relationship to the tax on nal consumption
goods; it depends on the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, the elasticity of labour
supply, and the degree of complementarity of goods and leisure via a simple formula. In
particular, if the sum of these elements is above (below) a cuto¤ value, then transactions
services should be taxed at a lower (higher) rate than nal consumption.
Thus, even when it is optimal to tax all goods at the same rate (justifying a VAT on
consumption), payment services are generally taxed at a di¤erent rate. We then solve
for the steady-state taxes, calibrating model parameters to the US economy. We nd
that when parameters are calibrated, simulations suggest that the transactions services
tax should be considerably lower, specically, around one sixth of the consumption tax.
The intuition is that a transactions tax has a "double distortion": it distorts the choice
between payment media, and indirectly taxes consumption. By contrast, the consumption
tax does not distort the choice between payment media, and so it is typically set at a
higher level.
This nding has implications for the current policy debate on the taxation of banks,
especially in Europe, where it is view of many, including the European Commission, that
banks are undertaxed, because many of their services are exempt from VAT. Our results
imply that this particular form of under-taxation may not be of great concern. Of course,
there are other reasons for taxing banks, for example, to charge ex ante for the social
costs of bailouts, or corrective taxes to discourage excessive risk-taking, and so on.
Finally, our nding of di¤erent taxes on transactions and consumption contrasts with
an important earlier nding in the literature, Auerbach-Gordon (2002). They consider a
life-cycle model of the consumer where purchase of goods requires transactions services,
which are assumed to be demanded in strict proportion to consumption. They show
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that if there is initially only a labour income tax imposed on the household, then this is
equivalent to a value-added tax if and only if the transactions services consumed by the
household are taxed at the same rate as other goods. This nding is often taken to justify
taxing transactions services at the same rate as consumption. The Auerbach-Gordon
result can be reconciled with our results by noting that theirs is a cashless economy. In
our model, if cash is not available, the optimal tax on transactions services is then not
independently determined, and a tax at the same rate as consumption is an optimal tax
structure. The intuition here is that when cash is not available, a transactions tax cannot
distort the choice of payment medium, and so there is no longer a "double distortion".
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related liter-
ature. Section 3 outlines the model, and Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5
studies a calibrated version of the model, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Our paper relates to several literatures. First, our model is a variant of the model of cash
and bank deposits due to Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998) and further developed
by English (1999), Freeman and Kydland (2000), and Henriksen and Kydland (2010),
amongst others. In this class of models, the relative size of demand for di¤erent varieties
of the consumption good is xed by a xed coe¢ cients utility index such as (3.2), and
then the use of cash or deposits to buy a particular variety j is determined by the relative
xed costs of using the two media. The initial purpose of these papers is to study the
e¤ect of ination on the volume of transactions services (bank deposits and credit cards)
provided by the banking sector; it is well documented that the use of transactions services
rises when ination rises. Subsequently, Freeman and Kydland (2000) and ustek (2010)
have used this type of model to explain various stylized facts about the co-movement
of various money aggregates and output. Because these models are fully micro-founded,
they are ideal for the study of the optimal tax on transactions services. Our paper is the
rst, to our knowledge, to fully analyze the optimal tax structure in this important class
of models6.
The second related literature is on dynamic optimal taxation, in particular, that part
of the literature focussed on the optimal ination tax7. This literature, building on the
6 Henriksen and Kydland (2010) compare the marginal cost of public funds from an ination tax to
that from a labour tax, but they do not consider the taxation of transactions services.
7We also assume linear income taxes, full commitment, and no information asymmetries, assumptions
that are shared by most papers on the optimal ination tax.
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seminal contributions of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) is of course, large. However,
as mentioned in the introduction, these models without exception, either assume (i) that
cash is the only medium of payment, or (ii) assume that an exogenously specied subset
of goods can be bought on credit, and are thus not subject to a cash-in-advance con-
straint. So, these contributions do not address the issue of how intermediation services
provided by banks should be taxed. The most closely related contributions are Chari
et al. (1991, 1996), who show that in a cash-in-advance model with credit goods, the
optimal ination tax is zero if utility is separable in consumption goods and leisure, and
the consumption sub-utility function is homothetic. This is related to our Proposition
1 below. Bhattacharya et al. (2005) explore the optimality of the Friedman rule in a
similar model with two-period lived consumers. These papers, however, do not allow for
a banking sector or costly transactions.8
Thirdly, there is a small literature directly addressing the optimal taxation of borrower-
lender intermediation and payment services (Grubert and Mackie, 1999; Jack, 1999; Auer-
bach and Gordon, 2002; and Boadway and Keen, 2003). With the exception of Auerbach
and Gordon (2002) - henceforth AG - these papers use a simple two-period consumption-
savings model without an explicit production sector, and assume that payment services
are consumed in xed proportion to aggregate consumption9. In this setting, it is straight-
forward to show that if there is a pre-existing consumption tax at the same rate in both
periods, the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption is left
unchanged if payment services are taxed at the same rate as consumption. AG consider
a multi-period life-cycle model of the consumer where purchase of goods requires trans-
actions services, which themselves are produced using other inputs. Transactions services
are assumed to be demanded in strict proportion to consumption. They show that if there
is initially only a labour income tax imposed on the household, then this is equivalent to
a value-added tax if and only if the transactions services consumed by the household are
taxed at the same rate as other goods10.
There are, however, a number of restrictive assumptions implicit in these existing
8There is also a less closely related literature which studies the optimal ination tax with a transaction
costs approach to the demand for money (Kimbrough, 1986; Guidotti and Vegh, 1993; Correia and Teles,
1996, 1999). They also nd optimality of the Friedman rule under certain conditions.
9Chia and Whalley (1999), using a computational approach, reach the rather di¤erent conclusion that
no intermediation services should be taxed, but their model is not directly comparable to these others,
as the intermediation costs are assemed to be proportional to the price of the goods being transacted.
10In particular, they show that if there is initially a wage income tax at rate ; which is replaced by a
consumption tax at equivalent rate =(1   ); then the real equilibrium is left unchanged if and only if
transaction services are also taxed at this equivalent rate.
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models. First, other taxes are assumed xed, not optimized, and it is implicit that the
existing taxes are non-distortionary, because the analysis proceeds by nding conditions
under which taxation of transaction services does not introduce any further distortions.
In turn, the only way in which a uniform consumption tax (or equivalently, a wage income
tax) can be non-distortionary is if labour is in xed supply, so it is arguable that this is a
further implicit assumption of the above studies. By contrast, we take an explicit tax de-
sign approach to the question, assuming a household demand for leisure, and investigating
the second-best tax structure, given that there is a revenue constraint.
Second, and equally importantly, one can argue that the modelling of transactions
services in the existing literature is at an abstract level, and not microfounded in any
way; the papers above simply assume that the cost of these services is proportional to
consumption. This corresponds to a special case of our model where cash is prohibitively
expensive, so the tax system cannot a¤ect the choice of payment medium. In that special
case, we nd that taxing consumption and transaction services at the same rate is optimal,
consistently with this existing literature.
Finally, there has recently been surge of literature11 studying banks that engage in
socially undesirable activities such as excessive risk-taking on both lending and deposit-
taking margins. The main nding is that these should be corrected by Pigouvian taxes (or
regulations) that apply directly to these decision margins, such as taxes on borrowing or
lending, not by making VAT on bank inputs irrecoverable. Our work is distinct from this
line of enquiry, as bank lending has no external e¤ects in our setting; we are concerned
with the design of taxes to raise revenue.
3. The Model
3.1. Firms
In each period t = 0; ::1; a single competitive rm produces an intermediate good from
labour and capital via the production function f(kt;ht); where kt is the capital stock,
and ht is hours of work supplied by the household. One unit of this intermediate good
can be transformed into one unit of a continuum of di¤erent varieties j 2 [0; 1] of a
consumption good, an investment good, a public good; and also into 1= units of banking
services: The nature of banking services is discussed in 3.2 below. The assumption that
labour is not needed to produce nal goods, the investment good and banking services is
11See e.g. Acharya et al. (2012), Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Keen
(2010), Perrotti and Suarez (2011), Vickers (2012).
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for convenience only and could be relaxed at the cost of additional complexity, without
changing the main results. Capital depreciates at rate ; so follows the usual process:
kt+1 = it + (1  )kt: (3.1)
Capital is rented from households and banks, at rental rate rt = fkt   . The wage is
determined by the usual condition wt = fht: We use (here and below) the notation that
for any any function f(xt ; yt) , the partial derivative of f with respect to xt is fxt; the
cross-derivative is fxyt etc.
3.2. Households
There is a single innitely lived household with preferences over levels of consumption
goods, leisure, and a public good in each period t = 0; ::1 of the form
1X
t=0
t(u(ct; lt) + v(gt)); ct = min
j2[0;1]
fct(j)=2jg (3.2)
where ct(j) is the level of consumption of variety j in period t; lt is the consumption of
leisure, and gt is public good provision. Utilities u(c; l); v(g) are strictly increasing and
strictly concave in their arguments and 0 <  < 1 is a discount factor. We also assume
ucl  0; an assumption further discussed below.
The xed coe¢ cients specication for the commodity index follows Freeman and Kyd-
land (2000); it allows for consumption levels of the di¤erent varieties to vary in an analyt-
ically tractable way. Specically, given an aggregate level of consumption, ct; it is optimal
to set consumption of variety j at ct(j) = 2jct; so consumption of variety j is increasing
in j:
Following Englund and Svensson (1988), and Henriksen and Kydland (2010), we as-
sume that the household faces a generalized cash-in-advance constraint; in period t; the
total nominal value of consumption must be matched by beginning of period holdings of
either cash (Mt) or demand deposits (Dt)12: There is a substantial empirical literature
on the use of cash versus other payment media, such as debit cards (Snellman et al.,
2001; Lippi and Secchi, 2009; Ten Raa and Shestalova, 2004). This literature nds that
the choice between the two is determined by: (i) the relative opportunity cost of the two
media; (ii) fees for the use of electronic payment media, and (iii) non-pecuniary costs, such
as time and inconvenience; (iv) the risk of having cash lost or stolen. Opportunity costs
12Often, these holdings are dated t  1; e.g. Walsh (2003), but it is more convenient to date them by t
here.
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alone would imply a corner solution where only cash or electronic media are used. This is
inconsistent with what is observed in practice, where cash is used for small transactions,
and cards for larger transactions13.
To model this, we suppose that cash becomes increasingly costly for large transactions,
via the increasing inconvenience of carrying it and keeping it safe, whereas the cost of
using deposits will be proportional to transactions. Formally, we suppose that there is a
xed time cost j;  > 1; incurred by the household if variety j is bought with cash.
As  > 1; the marginal cost of buying with cash rises faster than the marginal benet
of buying with cash, which is positive and linear in j when the opportunity cost of cash
(dened below) is lower than that of deposits14. This implies a cuto¤ jt such that only
goods j  jt will be bought with cash. Then the transactions constraints facing the
household can be written
Mt
Pt

Z jt
0
ct(j)dj = K
m
t ct;
Dt
Pt

Z 1
jt
ct(j)dj = K
d
t ct; (3.3)
Kmt = 2
Z jt
0
jdj = (jt )
2; Kdt = 2
Z 1
jt
jdj = 1  (jt )2
where Pt is the price of the intermediate good. Note that Kdt +K
m
t = 1: The rst of these
is just a cash-in-advance constraint, and the second is similar, in that it requires that real
deposits must be no less than the real value of goods purchased using bank deposits. We
refer to these two constraints collectively as transactions constraints.
In each period, the household consumes goods, supplies leisure, and can accumulate
capital, cash, or deposits. It must also divide its total time endowment between leisure,
work, and time lost to transacting in cash, so
ht = 1  lt   
Z jt
0
jdj  1  lt   (jt ) (3.4)
where (jt )  (j

t )
+1
+1
is the total time cost incurred in dealing with cash purchases for
varieties 0  j  jt : The nominal budget constraint says that the cost of consumption,
ctPt; plus end of period holdings of cash and deposits Mt+1; Dt+1, plus purchases of the
capital good by the household, PtkHt+1; must be equal to wage income plus nominal gross
13For example, using a sample of Dutch retailers, Ten Raa and Shestalova (2004) estimate that the
point at which households switch from cash to electronic payment media is somewhere between 13 and
30 Euros.
14In the case where the opportunity cost of cash is higher, no goods are bought with cash i.e. jt = 0:
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returns on holdings of money, deposits, and capital:
ctPt +Mt+1 +Dt+1 + Ptk
H
t+1 =
wtPt(1  wt )ht +Mt + (1 + ~rt(1   rt ))(1 + t)Dt + (1 + rt(1   rt ))(1 + t)Pt 1kHt
where t = PtPt 1   1; and  rt is an interest income tax, wt is a wage income tax: Moreover,
~rt is the real pre-tax return paid by banks on deposits, determined below, so (1 + ~rt(1 
 rt ))(1+t) is the nominal gross post-tax return on deposits. In the same way, (1+rt(1 
 rt ))(1 + t) is the nominal gross post-tax return on capital.
Dividing through by Pt; we can write this per period budget constraint in real terms
as follows:
ct +mt+1(1 + t+1) + dt+1(1 + t+1) + k
H
t+1 = (3.5)
wt(1  wt )ht +mt + (1 + ~rt(1   rt ))(1 + t)dt + (1 + rt(1   rt ))kHt ; t = 1; 2; ::
Finally, following Chari et al. (1996), we assume thatM0 = D0 = kH0 = 0; if these initial
conditions do not hold, then the governments problem is trivial15.
Eliminating the kHt by successive substitution in (3.5), using the fact that m0 = d0 =
kH0 = 0; bringing all terms inmt; dt to the left-hand side and using (3.4), the present-value
budget constraint can eventually be written
1X
t=1
Rt(ct +  
m
t mt +  
d
t dt) =
1X
t=1
Rt(wt(1  wt )(1  lt   (jt ))) (3.6)
where
Rt =
tQ
j=1
1
1 + rj(1   rj )
;  mt = (1+t)(1+rt(1  rt )) 1;  dt = (1+t)(1  rt )(rt ~rt) (3.7)
So,  mt ;  
d
t are the opportunity costs of holding cash and deposits relative to capital.
The household chooses fct; lt;mt; dt; jt g1t=1 ; to maximize
P1
t=0 
tu(ct; lt) subject to
(3.6), (3.4),(3.3). Without loss of generality, we can assume the transactions constraints
(3.3) hold with equality i.e. mt = Kmt ct; dt = K
d
t ct. Then, we can substitute out mt; dt
in (3.6) and just optimize with respect to fct; jt ; ltg1t=1. The rst-order conditions are:
ct : 
tuct = Rt(1 +  
m
t K
m
t +  
d
tK
d
t ) (3.8)
lt : 
tult = wt(1  wt )Rt (3.9)
jt : wt(1  wt )(jt ) = ctjt ( dt    mt ) (3.10)
15As is well-known, if the initial stock M0+D0 of nominal assets is positive (negative), then welfare is
maximized by setting the initial price level to innity (or su¢ ciently low). See Chari et.al. (1996), p207.
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where  is the multiplier on (3.6), and in the last line, we assume an interior solution
0 < jt < 1
16: Condition (3.8) says that the full price of consumption comprises the
purchase price 1; plus the cost of transacting, namely  mt K
m
t +  
d
tK
d
t . Condition (3.10)
says that at an interior solution, the optimal choice of jt balances the lower opportunity
cost of holding cash, equal to jt ( 
d
t  mt ); against the additional inconvenience cost of cash
i.e. wt(1 wt )(jt ). It can be solved explicitly to yield jt =

( dt  mt )ct
wt(1 wt )
1
=( 1): Corner
solutions for jt can be characterized in the obvious way. Below, we characterize optimal
taxes under the realistic assumption that at the second-best optimum, jt is interior i.e.
households use both cash and deposits.
3.3. Banks
There are a large number of competitive banks who provide demand deposits to house-
holds, and use the funds to purchase capital. Without loss of generality, there is no reserve
requirement, so the bank balance sheet in real terms can be written Dt
Pt
= kBt ; where k
B
t
is the bank holding of capital in period t . We have assumed above that payment ser-
vices (e.g. debit cards) associated with a unit of real deposits require  units of the
intermediate good and so the nominal cost of providing the payment services associated
with Dt is DtPt  Pt =  : The di¤erence in nominal returns between capital and deposits
i.e. (1 + t) (rt   ~rt) is the value-added of the bank per unit of deposit, and is taxed at
rate  dt : Then, as banks make zero prot, the after-tax value added per unit of Dt must
be equal to the cost of payment services per unit of Dt i.e.
(1 + t) (rt   ~rt)
(1 +  dt )
=  (3.11)
Finally, note from (3.11), (3.7) that
 dt =  (1   rt )(1 +  dt )   (1 + ~ dt ) (3.12)
So, ultimately, the opportunity cost of holding deposits for the household is  ; grossed
up by the e¤ective tax on banking services, ~ dt .
3.4. Government
The government nances the public good gt from tax revenues generated from taxes
wt ; 
r
t ; 
d
t and also real seigniorage revenues mt+1(1 + t)   mt. We do not specify the
16This requires that the marginal cost of cash at j = 1 exceeds the marginal benet i.e.  > ct( dt  
 mt ):
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nominal money growth rule at this point; as we will see below, at the second-best optimum,
nominal money growth will be chosen so as to implement the Friedman rule, that the real
opportunity cost of money,  mt , should be zero. We do not need to explicitly write out the
government budget constraint, as we use the primal approach to the tax design problem,
as explained below. Rather, the government faces the resource constraint for the economy,
which is Z 1
0
ct(j)dj + kt+1   (1  )kt + gt +  dt+1  f(kt; ht) (3.13)
where gt is the quantity of the public good required at time t:
3.5. Discussion
This model provides a general framework which encompasses17 the specic models of
taxation of payment services (AG; Boadway and Keen, 2003; Jack, 1999; Grubert and
Mackie, 1999) that have been developed so far. Indeed, if one removes cash from the
model, i.e. set jt = 0, we see that K
d
t = 1, and thus the overall price of ct; excluding all
taxes is 1+ ; i.e. there is a direct cost of 1 unit of the intermediate good, plus an additional
xed transaction cost of  : This compares to AG, who assume that the consumer price
of good i at time t is pit = cit + bit; where cit is the production cost of the good, and
bit captures any transactions cost of actually acquiring the good. This suggests that
microfoundationsfor the AG model can be given in this setting by assuming that cash
is prohibitively costly.
Our model is also very close to the well-known Freeman and Kydland (2000) model.
The key di¤erence is that in their model, a non-trivial choice between cash and bank
deposits is achieved by introducing a xed cost of deposits (specically, a xed cost of
paying for variety j); whereas in ours, it is generated by a time cost of using cash that
is increasing and convex in j. Our reason for departing from the Freeman and Kydland
specication is simply that at the second-best optimum, the Friedman rule holds i.e. the
opportunity cost of cash is zero, and so with an additional cost of using deposits, at
the optimum, the household would always be at a corner, using only cash. But then, the
optimal tax on banking services would be undened. It seems to us that both assumptions
are empirically plausible: there is undoubtedly some cost of setting up a bank account,
but at the same time, carrying large amounts of cash is inconvenient and risky.
17These papers also allow for savings intermediation,which can be taxed. The principles determining
the tax on this spread are somewhat di¤erent, and are analysed in a separate paper, Lockwood (2014).
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4. Optimal Tax Rules
We take a primal approach to the tax design problem. In this approach, an optimal
policy for the government is a choice of all the primal variables in the model, in this
case fct; lt;mt; dt; jt ; kt; gtg1t=0 to maximize utility (3.2) subject to aggregate resource,
and implementability constraints. The latter ensures that the governments choice is
consistent with household utility maximization, and it is obtained by substituting the
household rst-order conditions into the budget constraint. Substituting (3.8), (3.9) into
(3.6), and rearranging, we get:
1X
t=1
t (utct   ult (1  lt   (jt ))) = 0 (4.1)
which is the implementability constraint.
Also, the government must take into account the transactions constraints (3.3). Fi-
nally, the government also faces (3.13), (3.1), and (3.4). We combine these three to get a
resource constraint of the form
ct + kt+1   (1  )kt + gt +  dt  f (kt; 1  lt   (jt )) (4.2)
We now turn to the governments objective, which is
1X
t=0
t(u(ct; lt) + v(gt))
As is standard in the primal approach to tax design, we can incorporate the implementabil-
ity constraint (4.1) into the governments maximand by writing an e¤ective objective for
the government of
Wt = u(ct; lt) + v(gt) +  (uctct   ult(1  lt   (jt ))) (4.3)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on (4.1). As we have assumed that ucl  0; i.e.
consumption and leisure are complements, it is possible to show that   0 at the solution
to this tax design problem (see Appendix). If  = 0; the revenue from prot taxation is
su¢ cient to fund the public good, g: We will rule out this uninteresting case, and so will
assume that  > 0 at the optimum in what follows:
Also, note for future reference that
Wct = uct (1 + (1 +Hct)); Wlt = ult (1 + (1 +Hlt)) (4.4)
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where Hit and Hlt are dened by
Hct =
1
uct
(ucctct   ulct(1  lt   (jt ))) (4.5)
Hlt =
1
ult
(ucltct   ullt(1  lt   (jt ))) (4.6)
Here, uclt etc. denote cross-partials of u with respect to ct; lt: So, Hct is what Atkeson et
al. (1999) call the general equilibrium expenditure elasticity. Note that if there are no
transactions costs, i.e.  = 0, Hlt; Hct reduce to standard formulae found, for example, in
the primal approach to the static tax design problem (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).
The Lagrangean for the governments tax design problem is:
L = tu(ct; lt) + v(gt) +  (uctct   ult(1  lt   (jt ))) (4.7)
+ t (f (kt; 1  lt   (jt ))  ct   kt+1 + (1  )kt   gt    dt)
+ mt (mt   ctKmt ) + dt
 
dt   ctKdt

where t; dt ; 
m
t are the multipliers on (4.2) and the transactions constraints (3.3) respec-
tively. The rst-order conditions are:
ct : 
tWct = t + 
d
tK
d
t + 
m
t K
m
t (4.8)
lt : 
tWlt = fhtt (4.9)
dt : 
d
t = t (4.10)
mt : 
m
t = 0 (4.11)
jt :
 
tult   fhtt

0(jt )  mt ctjt + dt ctjt = 0 (4.12)
kt : t(fkt + 1  )  t 1 = 0 (4.13)
gt : 
tvgt   t = 0 (4.14)
The starting point for the analysis of these conditions is to observe that there is
no unique optimal tax structure. The intuition is that the government can (implicitly)
control four "prices" facing the household; the opportunity cost of cash and of deposits,
the price of consumption relative to leisure, and the relative price of present and future
consumption. But, the household only makes three choices; consumption, leisure, and the
relative proportions of cash and deposits (i.e. jt ) : total real cash and deposits holdings
at the beginning of the period are constrained to be equal to the value of consumption
via (3.3).
However, it is possible to establish a general property of all optimal tax structures on
the two payment media, cash and deposits. The true opportunity cost of cash is zero,
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and given a xed wage tax, the true opportunity cost of deposits in units of labour is
 =wt: On the other hand, the di¤erence between the cost of deposits and cash to the
household in units of labour is ( dt    mt )=wt(1  wt ); the wage tax increases the cost to
the household of any good or service. We can then show18:
Proposition 1. All optimal tax structures raise the relative cost of deposits to cash.
Specically, in units of labour, the di¤erence between the cost of deposits and cash to the
household, ( dt    mt )=wt(1   wt ); should exceed the di¤erence in the true opportunity
cost,  =wt:
The intuition for this result is the following. From (4.7), an increase in the use of cash
(an increase in jt ) increases maximum welfare for the government by amount ult
0(jt ) >
0; ultimately because it relaxes the implementability constraint.
To proceed, we focus on one and only one optimal tax structure that is simple and
intuitive. This involves setting the opportunity cost of cash equal to zero, i.e.  mt = 0 i.e.
leaving cash untaxed: In turn, this implies 1 + t = (1 + rt(1    rt )) 1 < 0 i.e. deation
just o¤sets the real return on capital to makes the cost of cash equal to zero. This is
of course, the Friedman rule. Given this, a simple and intuitive formula for the tax on
deposits emerges.
To state this formula, which involves the wage tax wt ; it is also convenient to trans-
form wt to the equivalent tax on all consumption 
c
t ; including consumption of payment
services, by observing that 1 +  ct  1=(1   wt ): Using  mt = 0 and 1 +  ct = 1=(1   wt )
in the household budget constraint (3.6), we have
1X
t=1
Rt(ct(1 + 
c
t ) + dt (1 + ~
d
t )(1 + 
c
t )) =
1X
t=1
Rt(wt(1  lt   (jt )) (4.15)
So, from (4.15), it is clear that payment services are taxed at overall rate:
^ dt = (1 + 
c
t )(1 + ~d)  1
We can then state an optimal rule for ^ dt :
Proposition 2. At any date t; the following taxes on cash and deposits are optimal.
First, the Friedman rule  mt = 0 holds. Second, the e¤ective tax on deposits in ad valorem
form is:
^ dt
1 + ^ dt
=

vgt   ult=wt
vgt

1
1 +Hlt
(4.16)
18All proofs (where required) are in the Appendix.
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The key part of this Proposition is (4.16), which characterizes the optimal e¤ective tax
on payment services19. To interpret (4.16), consider rst the rst term on the right-hand
side. If the household supplied one more unit of labour, this would cost ult in forgone
utility, but could be used to produce wt more units of the public good, which the household
values at vgt: So,
vgt ult=wt
vgt
is a measure of the social gain from additional taxation at the
margin, and we assume this is positive. To interpret the second term on the right-hand
side, note rst that given our assumption ucl  0; Hlt is strictly positive from (4.6), so ^ dt
is strictly positive. So, as we would expect from Proposition 1, deposits are taxed "more
heavily" than cash - the former at a strictly positive rate, the latter at zero.
Finally, in the simple case where ucl = 0; Hlt reduces to the elasticity of utility with
respect to leisure, times ht=lt: So, roughly speaking, Hlt measures the elasticity of labour
supply. This is an exact statement when in addition, u is linear in c: So, we conclude
that the tax on deposits becomes higher when (i) the value of taxation at the margin is
higher, and (ii) when the elasticity of labour supply is lower.
Our result on the Friedman rule is, by contrast, less original. For example, Henriksen
and Kydland (2010) note that in their version of the Aiyagari model, the Friedman rule
is optimal. Our analysis does show, however, that in a fully specied tax design problem
with a full set of tax instruments, the Friedman rule is not uniquely optimal. Proposition 1
is also related to Chari et al. (1991, 1996) who show that in a cash-in-advance model with
credit goods, the optimal ination tax is zero if utility is separable in consumption goods
and leisure, and the consumption sub-utility function is homothetic. In our setting, these
conditions are in fact satised, because minj ct(j)=j is a homothetic sub-utility function.
Of course, in our model, there are no credit goods; rather the purchase of some goods is
nanced from bank deposits.
We now turn to the key question of whether payment services should be taxed at a
higher or lower rate than consumption i.e. whether ^ dt exceeds 
c
t or not. As a rst step,
we can obtain the following characterization of the optimal e¤ective total tax rate on
consumption:
19Note that generally, the government can implement the Friedman rule  mt = 0 by appropriate
choice of money growth rule. To see this, note that if the nominal money stock grows at t; the real
money stock grows at rate mtmt =
1+t
1+t
  1: So, to achieve the Friedman rule, t can be set so that
t =
mt
mt
+ 11+rt(1 rt )   1:
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Proposition 3. At any date t; the optimal e¤ective total tax rate on consumption is
 ct +  K
d
t ^
d
t
1 +  ct +  K
d
t (1 + ^
d
t )
=

vgt   ult=wt
vgt

Hlt  Hct
1 +Hlt

(4.17)
where Hct; Hlt are dened in (4.5), (4.6).
On the left-hand side of (4.17), we have the overall e¤ective tax rate on consumption,
 ct + K
d
t ^
d
t ; in ad valorem form. The interpretation is that one unit of nal consumption
requires one unit of the marketed good, taxed at  ct ; and (conditional on the optimal
choice of jt );  K
d
t units of payment services.
Note that the right-hand side of (4.17) is identical to the formula for an optimal
consumption tax that also occurs in the static optimal tax problem, when the primal
approach is used (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, p377)20. First, as above, vgt ult=wt
vgt
is a
measure of the social gain from additional taxation at the margin, and Hlt measures the
elasticity of labour supply. Second, by inspection of (4.4),  Hct measures the degree of
complementarity between consumption and leisure; the higher this is, other things equal,
the higher the total e¤ective tax on consumption, a well-known result.
Finally, we are now in a position to address the question of the relative size of ^ dt
and  ct ; which is the central focus of this paper. Note that the left-hand side of (4.17) is
the weighted combination of ^
d
t
1+^dt
and 
c
t
1+ct
; and that the right-hand sides of (4.16),(4.17)
di¤er only by the factor Hlt  Hct: The following result is then immediate:
Proposition 4.(a) If Hlt  Hct = 1; then ^ dt =  ct ; (b) if Hlt  Hct > 1; ^ dt <  ct ; (c) if
Hlt  Hct < 1; ^ dt >  ct :
To interpret this, consider a steady state to lighten notation, and then recall from
(4.5), (4.6) that
Hl  Hc =  uccc
uc
+
 ulll
ul
h
l
+ ucl

c
ul
+
h
uc

(4.18)
So, other things equal, the higher the complementarity of consumption and leisure i.e.
the higher ucl; the higher is Hl  Hc; and thus the more likely it is that consumption is
taxed more highly than transactions. In the same way, as  uccc
uc
is an inverse measure of
the elasticity of consumption, the less elastic is demand for consumption, more likely it
is that consumption is taxed more highly. Finally, as  ulll
ul
h
l
is an inverse measure of the
20Howoever, inspection of (4.5) and (4.6) reveals that in our analysis, the Hlt;Hct are generally di¤erent
to the static case becaus of the term (jt ):
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elasticity of labour supply, the the less elastic is demand for labour, more likely it is that
consumption is taxed more highly.
The intuition for these ndings is as follows. Note that the transaction tax creates
a double distortion; it distorts jt ; the choice of payment medium, and via its e¤ect on
the left-hand side of (4.17), it contributes to the overall tax on consumption, and thus
the consumption-leisure choice of the household. On the other hand, the consumption
tax only distorts the second of these decisions. So, the transaction tax is relatively more
distorting when deadweight loss from a consumption tax is relatively low. This in turn
is the case when the consumption and leisure (or labour) choices of the household are
relatively inelastic, or when consumption and leisure are very complementary.
To get a feel for the overall size of (4.18), note that a standard specication in the
macroeconomics literature would be to take both  uccc
uc
and  ulll
ul
to be around 2.5. More-
over, for the US, working hours are about 1/3 of the total time allocation, implying an
h=l of about 1=2: Thus, even without any consumption-leisure complementarity, Hl  Hc
would certainly be greater than 1, and thus ^ d <  c: Detailed calibrations reported in the
next Section suggest that in fact, ^ d is about one-fth of  c on average, when parameters
are randomly sampled from distributions centred on their calibrated values:
We can also reconcile these results with the earlier literature on taxation of transactions
services discussed in Section 2. As argued above in Section 3.5, a special case of our model
where cash is not available as a payment medium is compatible with AG. This can be
captured formally by setting jt  0 by denition; thus the rst-order condition (4.12)
does not apply. This in turn implies that condition (4.16) no longer applies. In this case,
the optimal taxes  ct ; ^
d
t are only characterized by (4.17). It is then clear from that there
is an additional indeterminacy; there are an innite number of combinations of  ct ; ^
d
t that
satisfy (4.17). However, it is clear from (4.17) that one possible optimal structure is where
transactions and nal consumption are taxed at the same rate i.e.  ct = ^
d
t : This is of
course, the same nding as AG. We can summarize as follows:
Proposition 5. In the special case of the cashless economy, optimal taxes  ct ; ^
d
t are
indeterminate, but one optimal tax structure is equal taxation of transactions and nal
consumption i.e.  ct = ^
d
t
We complete our analysis of the tax rules by considering the capital income tax,  rt :
Here, we can show that in the steady state, the Chamley-Judd result holds in our model,
i.e.  rt = 0:
Proposition 6. In the steady state,  rt = 0:
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This simplies the implementation of the tax rules  c; ^ d; in the steady state, they can
be achieved just by two di¤erent rates of VAT on consumption and transactions services.
5. Calibration
Here, we solve numerically for the steady-state  c; ^ d and other endogenous variables of
the model, using calibrated parameters. First, we focus on the steady state, so we can
drop time subscripts for all variables. We assume a standard iso-elastic functional form
for utility in (3.2) of the form:
u(c; l) =
1
1   (c
1    1) + A
1   (l
1    1); v(g) = B
1  (g
1    1) (5.1)
The production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, i.e. f(h; k) = hk1 : Given
these functional forms, and the focus on a steady state, the equilibrium conditions can be
written as twelve simultaneous equations in twelve unknowns (c; l; h; k; g; ; w; j;m; d; ^ d;  c),
as described in Appendix A2. The parameters (A;B; ; ; ; ; ;  ; ; ; r) of these equa-
tions are calibrated as described in Table 1 below.
We discus these choices in more detail. First,  is the inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (EIS). In an important and well cited empirical study, Hall
(1988) concludes that it is not likely to be larger than 0.1. Other studies use a value of
0.2 (Chari et al., 2002; House and Shapiro, 2006; Piazzesi et al., 2007), or a value of 0.5
(Jin, 2012; Trabandt and Uhlig, 2011; Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012). We take a central
value of the EIS of 0.2, giving a value of  of 2.5.
Next,  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of leisure (EIL).
Empirical studies nd the EIL to be less than 1 (Mankiw et al., 1985). We assume a
central value of 0.2, giving a mid-value of 2.5 for . Next, we set  = 1. Finally, note that
as  = 1=(1 + r) in the steady state, r is xed at 5%.
From the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), the level of currency as percent of
GDP is m =M=Y = 6:1%, and deposits as percent of GDP is d = D=Y = 6:5%21. Next,
 is derived from the following calculation: from the BEA Input-Output tables, the value
of nancial intermediation services as a percent of GDP is D =Y = 1:6%: Combining
these gives  = 0:246:
21M is calculated as the value of currency from the FRED database, and D as M1 minus curency. All
values were for the most recent year for which Y was available, i.e. 2011.
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Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Mean Value Source
 Elasticity of utility w.r.t. consump-
tion
2.5 Hall, 1998 and others
 Elasticity of utility w.r.t. leisure 2.5 Mankiw et al. (1985)
 Elasticity of utility w.r.t. public good 1.0
 Cost of nancial services 0.25 BEA Input-Output ta-
bles, US FRED*
 Time discount factor 0.95
A Leisure parameter 1.0 Chosen to calibrate aver-
age value for US economy
B Public good parameter 0.5 as above
 parameter of the cost-of-cash function 5.0 as above
 parameter of the cost-of-cash function 1.5 as above
 Share of labor** 0.64 Henriksen and Kydland
(2010)
 Depreciation** 0.025 ibid.
Note: For each parameter, a value was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with
a lower and upper values of 25% around the mean value; * Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED); ** Parameters that were not randomly sampled.
Finally A;B; ;  were not specied exogenously but chosen so as to match the vari-
ables g;m; d; l; h to their respective average values for the US economy. These average
values are obtained as follows. First, m; d have already been specied. From the the
O¢ ce of Management of the Budget, federal government outlays are about 20% of GDP,
i.e., g = G=Y = 20%. Next, it is standard to take the fraction of time spent working at
around 30%, so we set h = 0:3: The Bureau of Labour Statistics Time Use Survey for
201122 nds that the average time spent shopping across all adults was 0.72 hours per
day. As a proportion of the available working day (16 hours), this is approximately 0.05.
This implies leisure l is a share l = 1  0:3  0:05 = 0:65 of the total time endowment.
22http://www.bls.gov/tus/
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Finally, we solve this system of equations using a Mixed Complementarity Problem
(MCP) algorithm23. We begin solving the model using the mean values presented in Table
1, and also perform sensitivity analysis on the various parameters by using a Monte Carlo
method. For each parameter, we randomly draw a value from a uniform distribution with
lower and upper values using an arbitrarily chosen value of 25% around the mean. The
model is re-execute 30,000 times and the results are collected and analyzed. We nd that
the average value for c is 50% and for bd is 8%. The gure below plots the relative tax
ratio (i.e., c=^d ). Its average is 6.4, with the 95% condence interval falling between 4.8
to 8.5 and standard deviation of 0.9.
Figure 1: Ratio c=^d
6. Conclusions
This paper has considered the optimal taxation of payment services in a dynamic econ-
omy. In our model, the demand for payment services is explicitly modelled via household
demand for cash, and for bank deposits. Realistically, both of these media of exchange
provide similar, but complementary, transactions services. We assume that cash is cost-
less, but we also assume that the banking sector incurs real resource costs in providing
23We used the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS), which is a high-level modeling system for
mathematical programming and optimization.
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deposits and the services associated with them. The question addressed in the paper is
thus how to tax the payment services provided by banks.
Our main nding is that transaction services should be taxed at a di¤erent rate on
consumption goods. Theoretically, this rate could be higher or lower. However, under
standard assumptions on parameters from the macroeconomics literature, and calibrating
the model to US data, we nd that the rate on transactions services should be lower,
perhaps only one six of the tax on consumption. This nding has implications for the
current policy debate on the taxation of banks, especially in Europe, where it is a view of
many, including the European Commission, that banks are undertaxed, because many of
their services are exempt fromVAT. Our results imply that this form of undertaxation may
not be of great concern. Of course, there are other reasons for taxing banks, for example,
to charge ex ante for the social costs of bailouts, or corrective taxes to discourage excessive
risk-taking, and so on.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proofs of Propositions and Other Results
Proof that   0: From (4.14), (4.9), (4.4) we have:
ult(1 + (1 +Hlt)) = wtvgt (A.1)
=)  = 1
1 +Hlt
vgt   ult=wt
ult=wt
Suppose to the contrary that  < 0 at the optimum. Then, from (A.1),
1
1 +Hlt
vgt   ult=wt
ult=wt
< 0 (A.2)
But, vgt < ult= ~wt, utility could be increased if 1$ of spending on the public good were
returned to the household as a lump-sum, contradicting the optimality of the policy. But
if vgt > ult= ~wt; then the only other possibility is that Hlt <  1 from (A.2). But by the
assumption that ulc  0; ull < 0; Hlt > 0 from (4.6). So, this is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Combining (4.10)-(4.12), and using t=t = 1=vgt from (4.14)
we get 
wt   ult
vgt

0(jt ) = ctj

t  (A.3)
As  > 0; this implies
 <
wt
0(jt )
ctjt
(A.4)
On the other hand, from (3.10), we have
 dt    mt =
wt(1  wt )0(jt )
ctjt
(A.5)
Combining (A.4), (A.5) gives
 dt    mt
wt(1  wt )
>
 
wt
as required.
Proof of Proposition 2. Setting  mt = 0 in (3.10), and using (3.12), we get
wt(1  wt )0(jt ) = ctjt  (1 + ~ dt ) (A.6)
Combining (A.3), (A.6), and using 1 +  ct = 1=(1  wt ); we get
~ dt
1 + ~ dt
=

ult
vgt
  wt wt

wt(1  wt )
= (1 +  ct )
ult
wtvgt
   ct (A.7)
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Using (A.1) in this last expression, we get
~ dt
1 + ~ dt
=
(1 +  ct )
1 +Hl
A   ct ; A =

vgt   ult=wt
vgt

(A.8)
But, manipulation of (A.8) gives
^ dt  (1 +  ct )(1 + ~d)  1 =
A
1 +Hl   A
Then, further rearrangement gives
^ dt
1 + ^ dt
=
A
1 +Hl
as required. 
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) From (4.4), (4.8)-(4.11), we have:
Wct
Wlt
=
uct
ult
1 + (1 +Hct)
1 + (1 +Hlt)
=
t + 
d
tK
d
t + 
m
t K
m
t
fhtt
(A.9)
=
1 +  Kdt
wt
And, from (3.8),(3.9):
uct
ult
=
1 +  Kdt (1 + ~
d
t )
wt(1  wt )
(A.10)
So, combining (A.9), (A.10), setting 1 +  ct  1=(1   wt ); and recalling that ^ dt = (1 +
 ct )(1 + ~d)  1; we get
( ct +  K
d
t ^
d
t )(1 + (1 +Hct)) =
 
1 +  Kdt

(Hlt  Hct) (A.11)
Then, adding ( ct +  K
d
t ^
d
t )(Hlt  Hct) to both sides, and rearranging, we get:
 ct +  K
d
t ^
d
t
1 +  Kdt + 
c
t +  K
d
t ^
d
t
=
(Hlt  Hct)
1 + (1 +Hlt)
Then, using (A.1) to substitute out ; and rearranging, we get (4.17) as required. 
Proof of Proposition 6. From (4.8), (3.7), we get
t 1Wct 1
tWct
=
1
Bt
uct 1
uct
=
t 1 + dt 1K
d
t 1 + 
m
t 1K
m
t 1
t + dtK
d
t + 
m
t K
m
t
(A.12)
=
t 1(1 +  Kdt 1)
t(1 +  Kdt )
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using dt =  t; 
m
t = 0 from (4.10),(4.11) in the second line, and where
Bt =
1 + (1 +Hct)
1 + (1 +Hc;t 1)
Moreover, from (4.13) and fkt    = rt; we have:
t 1
t
= 1 + fkt    = 1 + rt (A.13)
Combining (A.12) and (A.13), we get:
uct 1
uct
= Bt
(1 +  Kdt 1)
(1 +  Kdt )
(1 + rt) (A.14)
Finally, from (3.8), (??), we get:
uct 1
uct
= (1 + (1   rt )rt)
1 +Kdt 1 (1 + ~
d
t 1)
1 +Kdt  (1 + ~
d
t )
(A.15)
Combining (A.14), (A.15), and eliminating uct 1
uct
; we get
Bt
(1 +  Kdt 1)
(1 +  Kdt )
(1 + rt) = (1 + (1   rt )rt)
1 +Kdt 1 (1 + ~
d
t 1)
1 +Kdt  (1 + ~
d
t )
(A.16)
In the steady state, this reduces to 1+ rt = 1+ (1   rt )rt which of course, implies  rt = 0
as required: 
A.2. Calibration Equations
First, we have the market-clearing conditions for the intermediate good and labour;
c+ k + g +  d = hk1  (A.17)
h = 1  l   (j
)+1
 + 1
(A.18)
where (A.17) follows directly from (3.13). Second, the rms rst-order conditions for
labour and capital determine the factor prices:
w = 

k
h
1 
(A.19)
r =   + (1  )

h
k

(A.20)
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To derive the steady-state household budget constraint from (3.5), set all variables inde-
pendent of t; and set  m =  r = 0 from Propositions 1 and 3. This gives:
c+m(1 + ) + d(1 + ) + kH = (A.21)
w(1  w)h+m+ (1 + ~r)(1 + )d+ (1 + r)kH
Cancelling terms in (A.21), we get
c+m = w(1  w)h+ ~r(1 + )d+ rkH
But, by denition, kH = k   d; so
c+m = w(1  w)h+ ~r(1 + )d+ r(k   d)
Also,  =  r
1+r
; ~r = r    (1+d)
1+
; so
c  mr
1 + r
=
wh
(1 +  c)
+
 
r(1 + )   (1 +  d) d+ r(k   d)
Or,
c+
 
 (1 +  d) + r

d = w(1  w)h+ r
1 + r
(m+ d) + rk (A.22)
This is intuitive: the right-hand side says that total household income is income from
labour plus income from capital plus a seigniorage subsidy (due to the negative ination
rate). The household rst-order conditions (3.8)-(3.10) reduce to:
c  = (1 +  (1 +  d)Kd) (A.23)
Al  = w=(1 +  c) (A.24)
w(j)=(1 +  c) = cj (1 +  d) (A.25)
Next, the transaction constraints (3.3) reduce to
m = c(j)2 (A.26)
d = c
 
1  (j)2 (A.27)
Finally, noting that Kd = 1  (j)2; and using (5.1), the optimal tax rules simplify to
^ d
1 + ^ d
=
1
1 + h=l

Bg    Al =w
Bg 

(A.28)
 c +  (1  (j)2)^ d
1 +  c +  (1  (j)2)(1 + ^ d) =
h=l + 
1 + h=l

Bg    Al =w
Bg 

(A.29)
So, we obtain 12 equations (A.17)-(A.20), (A.22)-(A.29) in 12 unknowns:
(c; l; h; k; g; ; w; j;m; d; ^ d;  c), and the parameters (A;B; ; ; ; ; ;  ; ; ; r).
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